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NOTES

quite adequately be handled by the judiciary. It is submitted that
a further erosion of the taxpayer standing rule would allow the
Court greater freedom in protecting the individual's fundamental
constitutional rights without abrogating other traditional judicial
limitations.
Winston R. Day

LEASE OF A MOVABLE: HOW THE PUBLIC POLICY OF LOUISIANA
AFFECTS THE VALIDITY AND INTERPRETATION
OF EXCULPATORY CLAUSES

Plaintiff, a tree-cutter, rented an aluminum extension ladder
from the American Rent All Company of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. He signed a printed lease contract containing an exculpatory clause.1 Plaintiff, while working, climbed to the top
of the extended section of the ladder; it telescoped, causing him
to fall and sustain severe injuries. Held, the exculpatory clause
in the rental agreement between plaintiff and American Rent
All Company completely relieved the lessor and its insurer from
all liability. Such a stipulation is not contrary to the public
policy of Louisiana. The court did not consider whether the
ladder was defective or whether the plaintiff was negligent in
using the ladder.2 Celestin v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 387
F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1968).
The Civil Code of Louisiana contains an entire section devoted
to the obligations and rights of the lessor. These obligations of
the lessor are made part of every contract of lease by operation
of law. 3 However, these expressed statutory obligations of the
1. Celestin v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 387 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1968):
"The lessor makes no warranty of any kind on said equipment and the lessee agrees
to immediately return any leased equipment which develops indication of defect
or improper working condition: that the lessee agrees to use said equipment
entirely at his own risk, to be liable for any damage to persons or property resulting directly or indirectly from the use thereof and the lessee further agrees
to protect and save harmless the lessor, its agents, servants and employees from any
and all liability resulting from the operation or use of the above rented equipment . . . "

2. Id. at 539-40. Under the instructions given the jury in the trial court, the
general verdict rendered for the defendant did not disclose whether the jury found
(1) that the exculpatory clause completely absolved the defendant, (2) that the
ladder was defective, or (3) that the plantiff used it negligently.
3. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2692-2699. Article 2695 states: "The lessor guarantees
the lessee against all the vices and defects of the thing, which may prevent its being
used even in case it should appear he knew nothing of the existence of such vices
and defects, at the time the lease was made, and even if they have arisen since,
provided they do not arise from the fault of the lessee ; and if any loss should result
to the lessee from the vices and defects, the lessor shall be bound to indemnify
him for the same."
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lessor may be waived in the lease contract by an unequivocal
manifestation by the lessee that such is his intent, if this

agreement does not derogate from good morals or violate public
policy. 4 If such a contract renounced the lessor's obligation of

guaranteeing the lessee against the vices and defects of the
thing, this contract would be binding between the parties and
article 2695 would not apply.5 The broad language of article
2695 itself and the jurisprudence indicate that article 2695
would apply to leases of movables as well as immovables, when

the parties make no clear stipulation to the contrary.'
Since Louisiana courts have never decided whether an exculpatory clause in the lease of a movable violates the state's
public policy, the court in Celestin was compelled to reason by
analogy from the cases involving policy in relation to leases of
immovables. When an immovable has been leased, Louisiana
courts have always upheld the validity of exculpatory clauses

waiving obligations of the lessor to the lessee. 7 The jurisprudence, in adopting this view, has relied on several French commentators who all agree that, under most circumstances, a clause
relieving the lessor from the guarantee imposed by article 2695

does not contravene public order. 8 They reason that to hold otherwise would violate the principle of freedom of contract.
An early case, Klein v. Young, 9 had held that the owner
of the premises, as distinguished from the lessor, could not
relieve himself by convention from the liability imposed by
4. Id. art. 11. See Grundmann v. Trocchiana, 125 So. 171 (La. App. Or]. Cir.
1929) ; Pecararo v. Grover, 5 La. App. 676 (Orl. Cir. 1927) ; Lewis v. Pepin, 33
La. Ann. 1417 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1881).
5. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 11, 1901, 1945.

6. Lyons v. Jahncke Service, Inc., 125 So.2d 619 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
Accord, Blackburn v. Chenet, 42 So.2d 288 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1949). But cf.
Willis v. Schuster, 28 So.2d 518 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946). See generally Note, 21
'-TUL L. REV. 696 (1947).
7. Grundmann v. Trocchiana, 125 So. 171 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929) ; Pecararo
v. Grover, 5 La. App. 676 (Orl. Cir. 1927) ; Lewis v. Pepin, 33 La. Ann. 1417
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1881) ; cf. Klein v. Young, 163 La 59, 111 So. 495 (1926) ;
Clay v. Parsons, 144 La. 985, 81 So. 597 (1919) ; Torres v. Starke, 132 La. 1045,
62 So. 137 (1913) ; Pierce v. Hedden, 105 La. 294, 29 So. 734 (1901) ; Phillips v.
Mitthoff, 108 So.2d 669 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1959).
8. Pierce v. Hedden, 105 La. 294, 29 So. 734 (1901) ; Pecararo v. Grover, 5 La.
App. 676, 677-78 (Orl. Cir. 1927), citing 1 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET WAHL,
TRAITII TH]ORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL DU CONTRAT DE LOUAGE no 440
(3d ed. 1906) 3 DUVERGIER, DROIT CIVIL DE L'CIIANGE ET Du LOUAGE no 345
(3d ed. 1859) 30 DALLOZ, JURISPRUDENCE GENERAL, REPERTOIRE DE LEGISLATION
DE DOCTRINE ET DE JURISPRUDENCE no 196 (1st ed. 1853) ; 1 GUILLOUARD, TRAITk
DU CONTRAT DE LOUAGE no 121 (3d ed. 1891) 4 OEUVRES DE POTHIER, TRAIT]t DU
°
1 TROPLONG, LE DROIT CIVIL DE
CONTRAT DE LOUAGE n 114 (2d ed. 1861)
°
L'tCIHANGE ET DU LOUAGE n 198 (3d ed. 1859).

9. 163 La. 59, 111 So. 495 (1926) (owner held liable to lessee's roomer)
Gardiner v. Desalles, 126 So. 739 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930). But cf. Taul v. Graffato,
13 Or]. App. 338 (La. App. 1916)

(owner not liable to lessee's mother-in-law).
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articles 670 and 2322 to third persons. This jurisprudence was
overruled by the enactment of Act 174 of 1932,10 which was reenacted in virtually the same language as LA. R.S. 9:3221
(1950) .11 The court in the Celestin case stated that the legislative
overruling of Klein v. Young by the enactment of R.S. 9:3221
clearly indicated that a clause in a contract involving either
movables or immovables by which the lessee assumed responsibility for the condition of the thing leased does not contravene
the public policy of Louisiana, even though such clause had the
effect of relieving the owner of the responsibility imposed upon
him by the Civil Code in favor of third persons.
The Celestin case, however, dealt with the relationship between a lessor and lessee rather than that between an owner and
a third person. Even prior to the holding in Klein v. Young, a
lessor was permitted to contract with his lessee for an assumption by the latter of responsibility for the condition of the
premises. 12 Such an assumption had the effect of relieving the
lessor of his code responsibility to indemnify the lessee against
any loss arising from defects in the thing leased. But this
jurisprudence did not deal with the question of whether a
lessor who knew of a defect could shield himself by such a
clause against a lessee who was not informed of its existence nor
did it deal with the question of whether a lessor could absolve
himself of responsibility from his own negligence. It appears
merely to have given him an avenue of escape with respect to
defects of which he was ignorant or both he and the lessee were
informed.
10. La. Acts 1932, No. 174, §§ 1, 2: "Section 1. Be it enacted by the Legislature
of Louisiana, That the owners of buildings or premises which have been leased
under a contract whereby the tenant or occupant assumes responsibility for the
condition of the premises shall not be liable in damages for injury caused by any
vice or defect therein to any tenant or occupant, nor to anyone in the building or
on the premises by license of the tenant or occupant, unless the owner knew of
such vice or defect, or should within reason have known thereof, or had received
notice of such vice or defect and failed to remedy same within a reasonable time
thereafter."
"Section 2. That the term 'by license of the tenant or occupant' as used in the
above section has reference to those who derive their right or license to be on the
premises from said tenant or occupant, such as subtenants, roomers, servants,
guests, customers, employees, members of the family and others of a similar status."
11. LA. R.S. 9:3221 (1950) : "The owner of premises leased under a contract
whereby the lessee assumes responsibility for their condition is not liable for injury
caused by any defect therein to the lessee or anyone on the premises who derives
his right to be thereon from the lessee, unless the owner knew or should have
known of the defect or had received notice thereof and failed to remedy it within a
reasonable time."
12. Lewis v. Pepin, 33 La. Ann. 1417 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1881) ; cf. Clay v.
Parsons, 144 La. 985, 81 So. 597 (1919) ; Torres v. Starke, 132 La. 1045, 62 So.
137 (1913).
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If the holding in the Celestin case is merely that exculpatory
clauses which relieve the lessor of liability arising from leases
of movables do not offend the public policy of the state, it is
probably correct. But if the holding extends to cases where the
lessor knows of the defects and the lessee does not or to cases
where the lessor, but not the lessee, is guilty of negligence, serious
questions are presented. The decision in the principal case failed
to disclose whether the lessor actually knew or should have
known of the defects, or whether he was negligent in failing
to discover that the ladder did have defects before he leased it.
If the lessor actually knew of the defects and failed to reveal
them, it would appear that the consent of the lessee may have
been vitiated by fraud. 13 Although no Louisiana cases have considered this question, and found such fraud, several French
commentators do specifically state that a lessor will not be permitted to perpetrate fraud upon a lessee through an absolving
lease stipulation when the lessor actually knows of the defects
in the object leased.14 An analogy may be drawn between the
contract of lease and the contract of sale. In the first place, a
renunciation of warranty made by the buyer is not obligatory
where there has been fraud on the part of the seller. 15 In addition, the seller who knows of a vice in the thing he sells and
omits to declare it is answerable to the buyer in damages."6
In all cases where information which would have destroyed the
existing error has been withheld by the other party to the contract, it comes under the heading of fraud and invalidates the
contract. 7
A further question presented is whether or not a lessor can
contract away his negligence. The Celestin case touched on this
issue in dealing with the case of Sandel & Lastrapes v. City of
Shreveport, in which the court stated that "it is contrary to
public policy to allow a contractee to stipulate exemption from
negligent acts which cause injury.""' The court in Celestin attacked this statement by saying the court in Sandel & Lastrapes
did not support the statement by authority. No other Louisiana
CODE arts. 11, 1819, 1847(5), 1881.
ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS no 336 (6th ed. 1.946) ; 1 BAUI)IYLACANTINERIE ET WAIEL, TRAITt THItORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL DU
CONTRAT DE LOUAGE no 440 (3d ed. 1906) ; OEUVRES DE POTHIER, TRAIr1t DE CONTlAT DE LOUAGE no 114 (2d cd. 1861).
15. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2548; Roby Motors Co. v. Price, 173 So. 793 (La. App.

13. LA. CIV.
14. 5 AuBRY

2d Cir. 1937). See genzerally Note, 14 LOYOLA L. REV. 447 (1968).
16. LA. CIV. CODE 2545.

17. Id. art. 1832.
18. Sandel & Lastrapes v. City of Shreveport, 129 So.2d 620, 624 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1961).
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cases have been found which applied the principle of Sandel &
Lastrapes. French jurists, relying on French jurisprudence, indicate that it is well-settled French law that although the victim
may release his tortfeasor by convention from liability after
the tort has been committed, the tortfeasor cannot absolve himself of responsibility before the actual happening of the tort.19
The view expressed in Sandel & Lastrapes is consistent with
this position. It is submitted that public policy should not allow
a lessor to relieve himself of liability from his negligence when
the liability has not yet arisen and the lessee is unaware of the
full consequences which might result. Of course, where the lessee
is made aware of the defect, any loss to him that results from
it may be attributed to his own want of care rather than the
negligence of the lessor, but, if a latent defect which should have
been known to the lessor causes the loss, it is by no means clear
that an exculpatory clause should protect the latter. Policy
should be strict in this area in order to protect the public at
large from defective objects. An effective means of protecting
third persons from injury caused by the defective object would
be to place all liability caused by the lessor's negligence on the
lessor himself, regardless of any contractual provisions.
Although the wording of R.S. 9:3221 leaves much to be
desired, it does suggest that an owner cannot relieve himself
of responsibility toward his lessee with respect to defects of
which the owner knew or should have known. It is doubtful that
this view would apply in a case where the defect occurs during
the term of the lease and the lessee has assumed responsibility
for repairing it, but it may very well apply where the defect
exists at the time of executing the lease2contract
and its existence
0
should have been known to the owner.
Even though R.S. 9:3221 applies only to leases of immovables,
the principle of protecting the lessee from the lessor's fraud
and negligence, whether the lessor is the owner or not, has as
much, if not greater application in leases of movables.21 It is
suggested, therefore, that the lessor's obligations to the lessee
19. 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS 3hLtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS
no 320 (10th ed. 1953) ; 6 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL
FRANQAIS no 401 (2d ed. 1952).
20. Phillips v. Mitthoff, 108 So.2d 669 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1959).
21. There are many situations where the bargaining power and the knowledge
of lessee about the object leased is disproportionately less than that of the lessor
when a movable is leased as distinguished from the situation where an immovable
is leased. The typical case is where an individual customer rents a car, a power
tool, a television, or some other similar object.

432

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

may be waived in the lease of a movable or immovable, except
where public policy would be offended by the lessor attempting
to contract away his fraud or his negligence before it has occurred.
Lawrence R. Anderson, Jr.

